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Abstract
Incentive compatible mechanisms for eliciting beliefs typically presume that money
is the only argument in peoples utility functions. However, subjects may also have non-
monetary objectives that confound the mechanisms. In particular, psychologists have
argued that people favour bets where their ability is involved over equivalent random
bets  a so-called preference for control. We propose a new belief elicitation method
that mitigates the control preference. With the help of this method, we determine that
under the ostensibly incentive compatible matching probabilities method (Ducharme
and Donnell (1973)), our subjects report beliefs 7% higher than their true beliefs in
order to increase their control. Non-monetary objectives account for at least 27% of
what would normally be measured as overcondence. Our paper also contributes to a
rened understanding of control.
Keywords: Elicitation, Overcondence, Control. Experimental Methods.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D3
As economists have come to embrace the experimental paradigm long found in other
disciplines, they have emphasized the benets of incentivizing subjects. Incentives both
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encourage subjects to participate in a meaningful way and guide experimenters in their
interpretations of subjects actions. Typical incentive protocols rely on monetary payments
and an (often implicit) assumption that money is the only argument in individuals utility
functions. Thus, an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting beliefs is taken to be a
mechanism in which subjects maximize their utility of money by truthfully reporting their
beliefs.
However, while money is important, people also have non-monetary concerns. Re-
searchers who ignore these concerns may end up with a distorted understanding of subjects
actions and beliefs. It is important to have an idea of the magnitude of possible distortions.
Can they be safely neglected or do they undermine ndings? We report on a new experimen-
tal design that allows us to obtain a measure of one type of distortion, which we summarize
under the designation control, and to obtain a lower bound on the total non-monetary dis-
tortion present. We nd that the distortions are notable. At the same time, the amount we
can measure is not overwhelming. For example, when the matching probabilities method of
Ducharme and Donnell (1973)1 is used to elicit beliefs, at least 27% of what would usually
be interpreted as overcondence comes instead from a desire for control.
Numerous experiments determine subjects beliefs about themselves by presenting them
with the opportunity to win a prize either based on their performance on a task or based
on a random draw. In one format, subjects choose between a bet that yields the prize if
their performance places them in, say, the top half of subjects and a bet that yields the
prize with objective probability x (see, for example, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Grieco
and Hogarth (2009), Benoît, Dubra and Moore (2015), and Camerer and Lovallo (1999),
which uses a similar format). The experimenter concludes that subjects who choose to bet
on their performance believe they have a probability at least x of placing in the top half. In
another format, subjects are asked to report the probability that their performance will place
them in the top half. A subjects report determines, in an incentive compatible manner, the
probability that she will earn a prize based on her performance rather than from a random
draw (see, for example, Hollard Massoni Vergnaud (2010), Andreoni and Sanchez (2014),
Benoît, Dubra and Moore (2015), and Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus and Rosenblat (2014)).
The experimenter concludes that subjects who report the number y believe they have a
1This method seems to have been invented by Smith (1961) and implemented by Ducharme and Donnell
(1973), following on the Becker-Degroot-Marshack mechanism. It has also been adapted by Grether (1981),
Holt (2006), and Karni (2009). There does not appear to be a consistent name used for it in the literature.
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probability exactly y of placing in the top half.
Yet, social scientists have identied (at least) two reasons the above conclusions about
subjects beliefs may overstate their actual beliefs.
1. Control. People may have a preference for betting on themselves. Indeed, a long
tradition in psychology holds that people have a desire for control in their lives, which
may lead them to favour payments contingent on their performance over payments
determined by probabilistically equivalent random devices.
2. Positive statements. People may derive benets from making positive statements
about themselves, either because they savour positive self-regard or to induce favourable
treatment from others. This may lead them to exaggerate their odds of doing well on
a task.
The presence of such non-monetary concerns is problematic for the experimenter. As
Heath and Tversky (1991) write, If willingness to bet on an uncertain event depends on
more than the perceived likelihood of that event and the condence in that estimate, it is ex-
ceedingly di¢cult  if not impossible  to derive underlying beliefs from preferences between
bets. Heath and Tversky have in mind that subjects may choose to bet on their performance
even if they believe the probabilities do not warrant it from a monetary perspective. For
instance, a subject who thinks she has a 60% chance of placing in the top half of performers
on a task may nonetheless choose to bet on this eventuality over a lottery with an objective
65% chance of paying o¤.
It is indeed di¢cult to disentangle subjects beliefs from their disparate motivations by
observing discrete choices they make. But, by comparing the choices subjects make under
di¤erent conditions, we manage to isolate the desire for control and obtain a measure of the
bias it introduces.
In our rst experiment, beliefs are elicited using two di¤erent mechanisms. Under the
rst mechanism, subjects e¤ectively choose between betting on themselves and betting on
an objective random device. This mechanism employs the matching probabilities method,
replicating previous literature. Under the second mechanism, subjects e¤ectively choose
between betting on themselves on one task and betting on themselves on another task. This
novel design mitigates the control bias: no matter how subjects choose, they are betting on
themselves. Both mechanisms are incentive compatible in money.
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The implicit assumption in most of the existing literature is that the di¤erences in the
designs of the two mechanisms should not a¤ect the elicited beliefs. The two mechanisms
are incentive compatible, so they should yield the same distribution of reports if only money
matters. Nevertheless, we nd evidence for a signicant control e¤ect. With the matching
probabilities mechanism that duplicates prior studies, subjects inate their beliefs by 7% in
order to shift weight towards bets on themselves (at the cost of reducing the overall chance
of obtaining money). The experiment is run in the context of research on overcondence
and, as indicated above, at least 27% of what would otherwise be measured as overcondence
turns out to be a willful ination.
Hossain and Okui (2013) and Schlag and van der Weele (2013), building on previous
work by Allen (1987) and McKelvey and Page (1990), explore a di¤erent approach to belief
elicitation. They develop essentially equivalent ways of adapting proper scoring rules in a
way that avoids the problem of risk aversion. We analyze in detail the mechanism of Hossain
and Okui, which they term the binarized scoring rule.
With this rule, a subject reports, say, the probability that she will place in the top half
of quiz takers and is given a bet that sometimes pays o¤ when she places in the top half,
sometimes when she places in the bottom half. Clearly, the rule is subject to self-regard and
signalling caveats, as the creators of the rule realise. Less obviously, the mechanism is also
vulnerable to control issues, as we show in Section 4.
The analysis of the binarized scoring rule requires a rened understanding of the prefer-
ence for betting on oneself. Is it that people like to bet that they have done well on a task or
do they like to bet on their performance, regardless of its quality? If the former, are people
neutral about betting that they have done (unintentionally) poorly or do they actively dis-
like it and, if so, to what extent? In our second experiment, we address these questions by
running a series of treatments in which subjects sometimes bet on doing well on a quiz and
sometimes bet on having failed to do well.2 We nd that the control motivation manifests
itself only as a desire for betting on doing well; a payment for doing badly is perceived as a
negative.
While our study is carried out within the overcondence paradigm, its applicability is
general (see surveys by Schlag, Tremewan and van derWeele (2015) and Schotter and Trevino
(2014) on incentive compatible elicitation). The elicitation technique we introduce rewards
2Subjects are (stochastically) remunerated for each quiz question they answer correctly and they are not
forewarned that they might later bet on a poor performance, so their incentive is to do well on the quiz.
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subjects for their performance on one of two tasks, rather than either rewarding them for
their performance on a task or the result of a random device. This design idea can be used
independently of a desire to measure control and can be adapted to a variety of mechanisms,
including state-of-the-art schemes like the binarized scoring rule and the randomized scoring
rule of Schlag and van der Weele (2013).
In the economics literature, Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014) also investigates the
implications of control for the interpretation of choices between bets. We discuss their results
in sections 1.1 and 3.3.
1 Overstatement
In this section, we discuss some of the economics and psychology literature on non-monetary
concerns that can lead subjects to misrepresent their beliefs.
1.1 Betting on Yourself: Control
Several studies conclude that people prefer bets on themselves to bets on probabilistically
equivalent random devices.
In Goodie (2003), Goodie and Young (2007), and Heath and Tversky (1991, experiments
1, 2, and 3) subjects begin by answering a series of multiple choice questions and, for each
question, reporting the likelihood that their answer is correct. They do not realize how these
reports will be subsequently used.
Consider subjects who declare they have answered question i correctly with probability
(about) pi. In Goodie and in Goodie and Young, these subjects are split into two groups. In
the rst group, each subject chooses between (a) a bet that pays o¤ if her answer to question
i is correct and (b) the certainty-equivalent payment according to pi. In the second group,
each subject chooses between (a) a bet that pays o¤ with an objective probability pi and
(b) the certainty-equivalent payment. Subjects in the rst group choose the bet over the
certainty-equivalent more often than subjects in the second group. In Heath and Tversky,
each subject is given the choice between (a) a bet that pays o¤ if her answer to question i is
correct and (b) a bet that pays o¤ with the objective probability pi. Subjects take the rst
bet more often than the second bet, in domains in which they are competent.
These papers nd that subjects choices between betting on their answers and betting on
a random device are not a simple reection of the probabilities involved. Rather, subjects
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tend to display a bias towards betting on themselvesthe more so, the more condent they
are in their answers. Notice that when subjects choose to bet on themselves, they are
choosing an ambiguous bet over an objective one. The interpetation is that the desire for
control overcomes ambiguity aversion, at least when subjects have enough condence in their
answers3.
Heath and Tversky argue that people have a special preference for betting on their
answers in domains in which they are competent, while Goodie and Young dispute this
interpretation and maintain that people have a general preference for control. As Goodie
describes it, control is in play whenever the nature of the task is such that a participant
could take steps to favorably alter the success rate in subsequent administrations.4 Goodies
notion translates immediately from bets on answers to bets on any skilled activity, while
Heath and Tverskys notion requires some adaptation for activities. The exact reason a
person might favour betting on herself  be it control, competence, or something else  is
immaterial for our purposes and we, somewhat abusively, refer to any preference for betting
on ones performance on a task as a control motivation.
While the ndings of these papers are revealing, their methodologies do not permit a
measurement of the value of control or the amount by which a preference for control would
lead people to overstate their beliefs.5 Moreover, the ndings are weakened by the fact that
subjects reports of their likelihoods of correct answers are unincentivized. These papers
provide some motivation for our study but we do not undertake to match their frameworks.6
Neither do we investigate the reasons a person might favour self-bets; instead we evaluate
3Klein et al. (2010) explores the relation between ambiguity, controllability and competence.
4Thus, for Goodie a control motive is present when a person could improve on future answers to questions
by studying or improve on future performance on an activity by practicing. Goodie talks of future adminis-
trations of the task as the subjects have no chance for improvement in the current experiment and he wants
to distinguish control from the illusion of control. In the latter category, Li (2011) nds that subjects prefer
a lottery in which they choose numbers to one in which the numbers are randomly selected, even though
they recognize that the probabilities of winning is the same in the two. Our modelling accommodates both
notions.
5Subjects typically displayed overcondence in that they answered questions correctly less often than the
average likelihood they reported. As a result, they lost money by favouring bets on themselves  as much as
15% of earnings in one experiment in Heath and Tversky. It is impossible to tell to what extent these losses
reected overcondence and to what extent a sacrice for non-monetary objectives.
6Indeed, there are elements of these papers which we want to avoid. For instance, in Heath and Tverskys
second and third experiments, subjects are asked to rate their knowledge of the subject matter in addition to
their probability of answering a question correctly, which could have an e¤ect on their subsequent behavior.
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the impact of such a preference.
Owens et al. (2014) contrasts betting on ones own performance with betting on someone
elses. Subjects are incentivized to report their beliefs that they will answer a question cor-
rectly and their beliefs that a randomly matched participant will answer a di¤erent question
correctly. They are also asked to choose between a bet on their answer and a bet on the
matched subjects answer. Based on the reported beliefs, if subjects care only about money
they should choose to bet on themselves 56% of the time. Instead, subjects choose to bet on
themselves 65% of the time, pointing to a preference for control. However, the interpretation
of the results is somewhat clouded by the fact that the mechanism used for eliciting subjects
beliefs is itself prone to control issues. We discuss this experiment in further detail in Section
3.3.
These four papers, and ours, can be viewed as exploring special cases of source dependence
(Tversky and Wakker (1995)), whereby subjects consider the source of the uncertainty in
addition to the probabilities involved. For axiomatizations that allow for source dependence,
see Klibano¤ et al. (2005), Chew and Sagi (2008) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2015).
1.2 Positive Statements: Self-Regard and Signalling
People like to say nice things about themselves, both out of self-regard and because sending
out positive signals may induce favourable treatment from others. As Baumeister (1982)
writes The desire to be ones ideal self gives rise to motivations a¤ecting both the private
self and the public self ... It may also cause individuals to want an audience to perceive them
as being the way they would like to be... The experimenter constitutes a real and important
public to the subject.
Burks et al. (2013) runs an experiment in which subjects take a quiz and are asked to
predict the quintile into which they will place. Subjects also answer a personality traits
questionnaire, which reveals that people with a high concern for social image tend to place
themselves in high quintiles. The authors conclude that social signalling motives may lead
subjects to overstate their beliefs. Ewers and Zimmermann (2015) asks subjects whether
they believe their performance on a quiz was better or worse than the average performance
of another group. Subjects reports are either (a) only entered privately onto a computer
screen or (b) entered onto a computer screen and also given orally in front of other subjects.
The latter more public reporting results in signicantly higher self-assessments. The authors
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conclude that subjects inate their assessments in order to appear skillful to others.7
On the other hand, Benoît et. al. (2015) varies the perceived importance of a task that
subjects carry out. Although a more important task should give subjects a greater motive
to appear competent to others, the variation produces no e¤ect on reported placements.
2 Formalism
We now incorporate the desire for control and for saying nice things into a model of utility.
For ease of exposition, we develop our formalism in the context of the experiments we run,
rather than setting out the most general formulation. Our simple model allows us to identify
the e¤ect of control in our experiments. In Section 3.2 we discuss conclusions that are
independent of the specic modelling we adopt.
Consider an experiment where a subject undertakes a task for which her performance is
described by a variable  2

L; H
	
, where L indicates a low, or poor, performance and H
indicates a high performance. The subject believes there is a chance  that she will perform
well,  = H , and she is asked for a report p of this belief. She might earn an amount of
money m, depending on how well she does, the number p she indicates, and random draws.
If she has an initial wealth w and earns the amount m with probability r (p; ) and the
amount 0 with probability (1  r), her expected monetary utility from the experiment is
ru (w +m) + (1  r) u (w). We add two elements to this standard utility function:
1. Control. A subject derives an extra utility kick from money that is obtained for her
performance, rather than through a random device: when she is paid m for achieving
performance i she derives extra utility ci beyond the utility of the money itself.
8 More
precisely, a subject earns an extra utility ci when she earnsm and  = 
i, but she would
have earned 0 if instead  = j 6=i, ceteris paribus. When the elicitation mechanism is
such that this happens with probability qi (p; ), the expected utility gain is ciqi. A
complex bet might involve the possibility of sometimes paying a subject for having
done well, other times for having done poorly, so that in general the expected utility
7More precisely, Ewers and Zimmermann conclude that their ndings are consistent with some people
making reports that are higher than their actual beliefs and some having overcondent beliefs. Schwardmann
and van der Weele (2019) nd that people who can earn money by convincing others that they are high
performers, may deceive themselves as well.
8We safely omit any dependence of ci on the amount of money m, as this amount does not vary within
any of our experiments.
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gain from control is cHqH + cLqL. Perhaps the most natural reading of the literature is
that a subject derives a control benet only from money obtained for having done well,
not from money obtained for having done (unintentionally) poorly, so that cH > 0 but
cL  0. Experiment 1 examines the nature of cH , while Experiment 2 also examines
cL.
2. Self-regard and signalling. A subject who believes  = H with probability  and
reports p, gets an extra utility kick of n () p from the report, where n ()  0. If
n ()  0, then people derive no benet from their reports per se. If n0 () < 0, then
higher types see less reason to inate their reports. A more general formulation would
give the kick as x (; p), with x2  0. As self-regard/signalling motives are tangential
to our study, we use the formulation x (; p) = n () p which simplies the analysis.
We briey discuss the more general formulation in Section 3.2. (This is a reduced form
approach to incorporating self-regard and signalling benets. See Burks et al. (2013)
for a derivation of a signalling motive.)
A subjects total expected utility from participating in the experiment is
ru (w +m) + (1  r) u (w) + cHqH + cLqL + n:
Consider, for a moment, an experiment in which an individual is given a lottery ticket that
pays m if she answers a question correctly and 0 otherwise. If her belief in her answer is 
then, factoring in control, the expected utility of the lottery is u (w +m) + (1  ) u (w) +
cH . The expected control benet is cH , which is increasing in the subjective probability
of a correct answer, when cH > 0.
Intuitively, a person who believes she has only a small chance of answering the question
correctly, perceives little expected control benet to being paid for a correct answer, and
conversely.This feature of our modelling is consistent with experimental ndings, noted in
Section 1.1, that subjects are more likely to exhibit a bias towards bets on their answers when
they have a greater belief in the answers. In Section 5.1.1, we present suggestive evidence
from our experiment that people with greater self-belief inate their reports more for control
reasons. The evidence is only suggestive, as we did not plan to test this feature, which would
have required a larger sample size. (Our main purpose in this paper is to identify control
and measure its distorting e¤ects). Although the e¤ects are not always signicant, the signs
are always in the right direction.
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2.1 Other Motives
Technically, the di¤erence between the two non-monetary elements, control and self-regard/signalling,
as we have modelled them, is that the control benet is contingent, only accruing when a
subject is paid for her performance, while the self-regard/signalling benet always accrues,
by virtue of her report. The formalism itself can capture additional non-monetary motiva-
tions and variations on the two we have considered. For instance, according to cognitive
evaluation theory, a persons intrinsic motivation is higher when payment provides informa-
tion about her competence level (see Ryan, Mims and Koestner (1983)). As a result, people
respond more productively to rewards that are contingent on their good performance. An
extra utility kick cH for paid performance is one way of modelling this. Several studies have
found that people prefer taking decisions based on their own judgements rather than ceding
control to an algorithm, even when the algorithm is demonstrably superior, which can also
be modelled in this way.9 As to variations, it could, for example, be that statements made
to an experimenter and statements made as inputs on a computer yield di¤erent benets, so
that n () p is in fact the result of two di¤erent components.
3 First Experiment: Controlling for Control
This experiment was run at the CREED Lab at the University of Amsterdam. The subject
pool consisted of 313 undergraduate students from the university. The experiment was pre-
registered and the pre-registration materials can be found in Appendix C.10
The experiment comprises two treatments that allow us to isolate and measure the control
motive. The rst treatment closely follows the matching probabilities method, which has
been widely used to elicit beliefs, notably in studies on overcondence (for example, Möbius
et al. (2014) and Benoît et al. (2015)). With this design, beliefs are elicited by having
subjects compare bets on their performance on a task with bets on a random device. The
second treatment uses a new design in which beliefs are elicited by having subjects compare
9Logg, Minson, and Moore (2018) argues that, although there is a widespread impression that people pre-
fer human over algorithmic judgements, following the seminal Meehl (1954), actually people have a preference
for decisions based on their own judgements rather than a general preference for human judgements.
10The pre-registration is also available at https://aspredicted.org/zu3pc.pdf. The second study in the pre-
registration is a test of Kruger and Dunnings (1999) unskilled and unaware hypothesis. The Appendix
reports only the portion of the instructions which is relevant for the present study. The online Appendix
reports the instructions for both studies.
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bets which all depend on their performance, on one of two tasks.
The main hypothesis is that there is a control motive to overstate placement in Treatment
1 but not in Treatment 2, while self-regard/signalling motives are the same in the two
treatments. As a result, the average reported placement should be higher in Treatment 1
than in Treatment 2. The di¤erence in average reports can be used to measure the control
motive. Moreover, the distribution of reported beliefs in Treatment 1 should rst order
stochastically dominate the distribution of beliefs in Treatment 2.
Timeline of the experiment
The two treatments share the following timeline.
1. Subjects undertake a visual task in which, on 10 occasions, a blinking string of numbers
appears on a computer screen, after which they are asked to reproduce the string. The
di¢culty of the task varies across repetitions in the length of the string and the duration
of the blinks. All the subjects see the same sequence of strings.
2. Call si the share, or fraction, of the ten repetitions of the task in which subject i
correctly identies the string. Each subject i is told si.
3. Subjects answer three sample questions, similar to questions they will later answer in a
logic quiz. Before they answer the sample questions, they are informed of the similarity
and of the fact that they will need to form an incentivized assessment of their quiz
performance compared to others.
4. Subjects are told the median quiz score of people that took the same quiz on prior
occasions. Each subject is asked to report the chance that she will place in the top half
of quiz-takers. One of two (monetarily) incentive compatible methods, one for each
treatment, is used to incentivize the reports. Details are given below.
5. Subjects take a logic quiz in which they answer twelve multiple choice questions. The
subjects are ranked according to their scores, with ties broken randomly.
6. Subjects are paid based on their performances in the visual task and the quiz and the
accuracy of their reported beliefs, in a way which depends on the treatment assignment
and is further elaborated upon below.
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Two mechanisms for belief elicitation
The two treatments di¤er solely in the way in which the beliefs elicited in step 4 above are
incentivized. The incentive mechanisms are summarized below; the instructions given in the
experiment are in the Appendix.
Treatment 1. Suppose subject i has indicated a probability p1 of placing in the top half.
A number x 2 [0; 1] is drawn uniformly. If x  p1 the subject wins R lottery tickets if her
score is above the median score of the experimental session, with ties broken randomly. If
x > p1, with probability x she wins R lottery tickets. In all other cases, she wins nothing.
Treatment 2. Suppose subject i has indicated a probability p2 of placing in the top half.
A number x 2 [0; 1] is drawn uniformly. If x  p2 the subject wins R lottery tickets if her
score is above the median score of the experimental session, with ties broken randomly. If
x > p2, with probability x she wins Ti lottery tickets if she was successful in a randomly
drawn instance of the visual task (Note that here the subjects skill is at play even when
x > p2.) In all other cases, she wins nothing.
The R lottery tickets that can be won in each treatment yield a 3
10
chance of obtaining e20.
For subject i, the Ti lottery tickets that can be won in Treatment 2 yield a
3
10si
probability
of obtaining e20 when si 
3
10
(recall that si is the fraction of correct answers on the visual
task); when si <
3
10
the probability is capped at 1. Subjects are told the numerical value of
3
10si
without being apprised of its dependence on si.
In both treatments, a subject for whom si 
3
10
should truthfully report her subjective
belief that she will place in the top half of subjects, if she cares only about her monetary
payo¤. To see this, look at the choice between i) a placement bet which yields e20 with
probability 3
10
if the subject places in the top half and ii) a random bet which, with probability
x, yields e20 with probability 3
10
. A money-oriented subject who believes she has a chance
 of placing in the top half prefers the placement bet when x <  and the the random
bet when x > . The mechanisms in the two treatments implement this preference by
e¤ectively asking the subject for the threshold probability p that causes her choice to switch
from the placement bet to the random bet. Clearly, the subject optimizes by declaring
p = .11 For the 9% of subjects with a capped probability in Treatment 2, the mechanism is
11The incentive properties of the mechanisms was explained to the subjects.
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not (monetarily) incentive compatible and in the empirical analysis we sometimes treat this
group separately.
We now turn to subjects who also have non-monetary concerns. We rst undertake an
informal analysis not tied to our specic modelling.
Consider a subject who estimates her chance of placing in the top half to be :
 In Treatment 1, any utility she derives from making positive statements about herself
gives her an incentive to exaggerate her reported belief p1. On top of this, a declaration
p1 means that with probability p1 winning the e20 is dependent on her performance
on the quiz, while with probability (1  p1) winning depends completely on a random
device. Utility she derives from betting on herself gives her a further incentive to inate
her report, in order to shift weight onto earning money for doing well rather than for
being lucky.
 In Treatment 2, as in Treatment 1, the subject may exaggerate her report in order to
say nice things about herself. Now, however, she can only earn money when she has
performed well, either on the quiz or on the visual task. Utility derived from betting
on herself no longer gives a further incentive to distort.
Because a preference for control provides an incentive to inate in Treatment 1 but not
in Treatment 2, we expect p1 > p2 if subjects have control motives. The di¤erence in the
reports, p1 p2, can be used to establish measures of the control e¤ect and the total distortion
due to non-monetary objectives.
We now reason formally, adopting the normalizations u (w) = 0 and u (w + 20) = U ,
where w is a subjects initial wealth.
In Treatment 1, a subject who believes she has a probability  of being in the top half
but reports a probability p1 has a subjective probability p1
3
10
+(1  p1)
(1+p1)
2
3
10
of winning
the e20. Note that (1  p1) is the chance that the random draw x is above p1 and
(1+p1)
2
is
then the average value of x. In addition to the potential money gain, the subject derives a
control benet cH when she is paid for doing well on the quiz. The probability that she is
paid for doing well  that is, the probability she earns money when she places in the top half
but would not have earned it had she not placed in the top half  is p1
3
10
. The subject also
obtains a self-regard benet n () p1 from her report. She has a total expected utility of
p1+
1  p21
2

3
10
U + p1
3
10
cH + n () p1. (1)
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This is maximized by a report
p1 =  (1 + CH) +N () ; (2)
making the substitutions N () = 10
3
n()
U
and CH =
cH
U
.12
If a subject cares only about money, so that N ()  0 = CH , then p

1 = . Hence, the
mechanism is monetarily incentive compatible. If N () > 0 and/or CH > 0, the subject
overstates her beliefs. We can interpret CH as the subjects overstatement due to control
concerns, N () as the overstatement due to self-image concerns, and CH + N () as the
total distortion.
In Treatment 2, a subject who believes she has a probability  of being in the top half and
reports a probability p2 has a subjective probability p2
3
10
+ (1  p2)
(1+p2)
2
si
3
10si
of winning
e20. The probability that she earns the money for her performance, either on the quiz or
on the visual task, is also p2
3
10
+ (1  p2)
(1+p2)
2
si
3
10si
. Her total expected utility is13

p2+
1  p22
2

3
10
(U + cH) + n () p2: (3)
This is maximized by a report p2
p2 = +
N ()
CH + 1
; (4)
making the same substitutions.
If N ()  0 then p2 = , so the mechanism is monetarily incentive compatible. If
N () > 0 then p2 >   a subject with self-regard/signalling objectives overstates. Note
that a control motivation, CH > 0, does not give a reason to overstate; on the contrary, it
dampens the self-image ination. The reason for this dampening is that the control incentive
reinforces the impetus to report truthfully, since p2 =  maximizes both the probability that
the subject earns money and the probability that she earns it for doing well (as doing well
is the only way she can earn money).
The proposition below uses the di¤erences in the two treatments to examine the nature
of the control benet. As a preliminary to the proposition, consider a lottery ticket that pays
e20 if a subject places in the top half of participants and 0 otherwise, yielding an expected
12More precisely, we should write p1 = min f (1 + CH) +N () ; 1g. About 7% of subjects across the two
treatments declare a probability of 1.
13We assume that control benets do not depend on the task involved. See Section 3.2 for a discussion of
relaxing our assumptions.
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utility of u (w + 20)+(1  ) u (w)+cH = U+CHU , where CHU is the control benet
yielded by the lottery. Previous research suggests that people derive utility from being
rewarded for doing well, so that CH > 0. A weaker postulate is that people certainly do not
dislike being paid for doing well, so that CH  0. A still weaker assumption is that, in any
case, receiving the lottery ticket cannot be a bad thing, so that U+CHU  0) CH   1,
for  > 0. We use this weaker assumption in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that CH   1 and consider a subject in our experiment for whom
 > 0. Her optimal reported beliefs p1 and p

2 satisfy i) p

1 = p

2 if and only if CH = 0 , and
ii) p1 > p

2 if and only if CH > 0:
Proof. For i), note that p1 = p

2 if and only if  (1 + CH) + N () =  +
N()
CH+1
, which
holds if and only if CH = 0 (recall that N ()  0).
For ii), rst suppose that 1  CH  0. Then  (1 + CH)+N ()  +
N()
CH+1
. Conversely,
CH > 0 implies  (1 + CH) +N () > +
N()
CH+1
.
3.1 Identication
We adopt a between subject design, with each subject participating in either Treatment 1 or
Treatment 2. The two groups are drawn from the same pool, hence we make the standard
assumption that the expected values of their beliefs are the same  E (1) = E (2) = E ().
To achieve identication (the statistical analysis will follow in Section 5.1), we treat our
samples as large, so that mean beliefs in the two groups are the same  1 = 2 = E () , the
sample average reported beliefs, p1 and p2, satisfy p1 = E(p

1)  p1
 and p2 = E(p

2)  p2
,
and the mean value of N is the same in the two groups  N (1) = N (2) = N .
Consider Treatment 1. The standard interpretation of results in this type of experiment
is that a nding of p1 >
1
2
indicates the population is overcondent, since the mechanism is
incentive compatible and the mean belief in a well-calibrated population should be 1
2
(see
Benoît and Dubra (2011)). However, using (2) and averaging, we obtain p1 =  + CH +
N
and an alternative possibility is that  = 1
2
but CH > 0 and/or N > 0. Then CH is the
mean overstatement due to control concerns, N is the mean overstatement due to self-image
concerns, and CH + N is the mean total distortion. It is impossible to tell on the basis of
Treatment 1 alone to what extent, if any, a nding of p1 >
1
2
reects non-monetary concerns
rather than overcondent self-evaluations.
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However, Treatment 1 and 2 can be combined to elucidate the role of non-monetary
concerns. First, Proposition 1 yields a test for the sign of CH . A signicant di¤erence in
treatment averages, p1  p2 > 0, will imply that CH > 0, so that the desire for control distorts
reported beliefs. Our experimental ndings, discussed in greater statistical detail in Section
5.1, are that p1 = 66:15% and p2 = 61: 82%. The di¤erence p1   p2 = 4:33% is signicant at
the 5% level, conrming the hypothesis that p1 > p2. Moreover, the empirical distribution
of p1s almost rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of p2s, as predicted by
the control hypothesis (see Figure 1 in section 5.1.)
We can leverage the model further. Using (2) and (4), and averaging within the groups,
we obtain
CH + N = p

1   p

2 +
N
CH + 1
 p1   p

2 = p1   p2:
Thus, p1  p2 gives a lower bound on the overstatement CH + N in Treatment 1 that is due
to non-monetary concerns rather than to overcondence. This treatment uses a standard-
type incentive mechanism and nds that, on average, people report an overestimate of their
chances of being in the top half of 16:15 percentage points. However, of this, at least 4:33
percentage points come from a willful ination rather than a miscalibration. Put di¤erently,
at least 26:8 1% = 4:33
16:15
of the measured overcondence in this experiment comes from control
and self-regard/signalling distortions.
We can be more specic about the control mark-up CH . Again using (2) and (4), we
have
CH =
p1   p

2
p2
=
p1   p2
p2
= 7%: (5)
On average, each subject in Treatment 1 inates her report by a factor of 7% to derive
control benets 0:07.
Recall that the marginal benet of control is cH = CHU , where U = u (w + 20)  u (w),
so that cH = 0:07 (u (20 + w)  u (w)). In words, the marginal utility from inating for
control reasons is 7% of the added utility from a gain of e20.
3.2 Modelling
Let us step back for a moment to consider what conclusions obtain without adopting a
specic model.
On the face of it, the mechanism in Treatment 2 mitigates control incentives, since a
subject can only earn money for a successful performance on one of two tasks, whereas in
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Treatment 1 a subject can earn money either for her performance or from a random draw.14
This mitigation leads to the prediction that p1 > p2 without any formal modelling. The
conrmation we obtain of this prediction is good evidence for the existence of a control
e¤ect and for the e¤ectiveness of the new elicitation design.
When subjects with high beliefs inate their reports for non-monetary reasons, they may
hit the reporting constraint of 100%. If, as an illustration, all subjects wanted to inate
their beliefs by a factor of 10%, then those with beliefs above 91% would all make reports of
100%, causing a cluster at this number. If subjects wanted to inate their beliefs by a factor
of 15%, then those with beliefs above 87% would all make reports of 100%. A greater desire
to inate leads to more bunching at 100%. Since Treatment 1 has an additional control
reason to inate relative to Treatment 2, we should expect a relative jump in the number of
reports clustering at 100% in Treatment 1. And, indeed, 10.7% of subjects report 100% in
Treatment 1 compared to 4.6% of subjects in Treatment 2  a di¤erence which is signicant
at the 5% level.15
Our model permits sharper conclusions, at the cost of added assumptions. The model
assumes that money earned for success on the quiz and money earned for success on the
visual task yield the same control benet. The assumption is plausible, especially given
that the success rates on the two tasks are similar  61% and 63%  but we do not test
it. The two tasks were expressly constructed to be dissimilar in their natures, as opposed
to their success rates, as we did not want a subjects performance on one task to yield
(much) information about performance on the other. Due to design constraints, the timing
of the tasks is asymmetric: beliefs are elicited after the visual task but before the quiz. The
model assumes that these di¤erences are unimportant.16 These assumptions lead to control
incentives merging completely with monetary incentives in Treatment 2. It is easy to adapt
the model to the case where the two tasks yield di¤erent control benets. If being rewarded
for success on the somewhat unconventional visual task yields a smaller control benet than
14Arguably, the mechanism in Treatment 2 is somewhat more complicated than the mechanism in Treat-
ment 1 but it is unclear what impact, if any, this might have on reports. In a di¤erent context, Experiment
2 nds no impact simply from experimental variations.
15When we place subjects into reporting bins of size 10%, plus a bin at 100%, we ony nd a signicant
jump at 100%.
16For Goodie (2003), the fact that the visual task has already been completed does not a¤ect the control
motive, which depends upon the participant being able to improve her performance in subsequent trials.
(See Section 1.1.)
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being rewarded for placement on the logic quiz, our calculations understate the e¤ect of
control, and conversely.
Our model assumes that self regard motives yield a benet n () p, rather than using
a more general formulation x (; p). The more general x (; p) yields similar results if the
function is well-behaved.17
3.3 Betting on yourself or someone else
In Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014), subjects choose between a bet that will pay $20 if
they answer a question correctly and a bet that will pay $20 if a matched subject answers
a di¤erent question correctly. Let s be a subjects belief that she will answer her question
correctly and m be her belief that the matched subject will answer his question correctly.
The easiest behaviour to interpret is the use of a cuto¤ strategy. With a cuto¤ strategy, a
subject bets on herself if s   m > k, for some number k. If k = 0, the subject maximizes
her expected monetary payo¤; if k < 0 the subject values control and is willing to sacrice
money in order to bet on herself; if k > 0 the subject prefers to bet on someone else. Owens
et al. use the word control as an umbrella term that encompasses any reason a person
might favour a bet on herself. This includes choosing to bet on yourself to send a positive
signal.
The beliefs s; m are not known to the experimenters. Rather, subjects are incentivized
to make reports ps and pm of their beliefs, using a matching probabilities method similar to
the one we use in Treatment 1. The subjects behaviour is evaluated with respect to these
(observable) reports. That is, a subject is deemed to follow a cuto¤ strategy if she bets on
herself when ps   pm > k, for some number k. When k < 0, the subject is said to exhibit a
preference for control. The authors determine that the behaviour of 82% of the subjects is
consistent with a cuto¤ strategy.
Let us apply our modelling to this experiment. To begin, we keep things simple and
assume that a) subjects have only a pure control motive, so that cH > 0 but n ()  0,
and b) they evaluate money won for someone elses performance purely in monetary terms.
17In particular, with the formulation x (; p) suppose that x2  0, and x22  0. Writting X =
10
3
x
U
, we
now have p1 =  (1 + CH)+X2 (; p

1) ; p

2 = +
X2(;p

2
)
CH+1
and CH+ X2 (p

1; ) = p

1  p

2+
X2(;p

2
)
CH+1
 p1  p

2,
which mirrors our previous analysis. If in additionX22 is small, then CH =
p1 p2
p2
+
X2(;p

2
)  X2(;p

1
)
p2
 p1 p2p2 :
Otherwise, since the distribution of p1s almost rst order stochastically dominates that of p2s, CH 
p1 p2
p2
for reasonable functions.
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Under these assumptions, the elicited beliefs are given by
ps = s (1 + CH) and p

m = m, (6)
using the normalizations u (w) = 0; u (w + 20) = U; and CH = cH=U .
Now consider a subjects decision whether to bet on herself or bet on her match. Using
our modelling, her payo¤ for betting on herself is
su (w + 20) + (1  s) u (w) + scH = sU + sCHU , (7)
while the payo¤ for betting on her match is
mu (w + 20) + (1  m) u (w) = mU: (8)
A subject chooses to bet on herself if s   m >  sCH . If cH > 0, as we nd on average,
then the unobservable cuto¤ k =  sCH is negative.
In terms of observables, from (6) we have that s m >  s
cH
U
if and only if ps qs > 0.
Although the true cuto¤ k is negative, the measured cuto¤ k^ should be zero. Put di¤erently,
we have k^ = 0 even for a subject with a positive control motivation (or a negative one, for
that matter). In line with this reasoning, in one of their analyses, Owens et al. determine
that, of the subjects with a cuto¤ behavior, 65% have a behavior that is consistent with a
cuto¤ of 0. When these subjects are counted as not having a control motivation, our analysis
implies that control is under-measured. In their conclusion, Owens et al. also reason that
they have found a lower bound on the e¤ect of control incentives.
Although the above reasoning suggests that 0 should be the measured cuto¤, 26% of sub-
jects display a strictly negative cuto¤ (and 9% a strictly positive cut-o¤). This discrepancy
can be reconciled with our modelling in several ways.
1. When given a direct choice between a bet on themselves and a bet on another person,
some subjects may feel an extra push to bet on themselves. This push could be
because of the positive signal sent by betting on oneself over someone else, because
of the inherently larger ambiguity in a bet on someone else, or for some other reason.
Such a push is consistent with the discussion in Owens et al. of the various reasons
subjects may prefer bets on themselves. In terms of the above analysis, the simplifying
assumptions a) and b) may not both hold.
2. The incentive to inate for control may be especially salient to subjects in this exper-
iment, where subjects are presented with a direct choice between two bets in contrast
to the more elaborate matching probabilities mechanism.
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3. Procedural details in this experiment and in ours may (inadvertently) play a role in
the results.
The distinction between i) self-bets versus bets on someone else and ii) self-bets versus
bets on a random device is an interesting one that our experiment and theory does not
explore.
4 Second Experiment: The Meaning of Control
Experiment two was also run at the CREED Lab at the University of Amsterdam, this time
with one hundred ninety-six undergraduates. There was no overlap in the subject pools of
the two experiments.
This experiment seeks a better understanding of the control motivation. Our rst exper-
iment showed that people have a positive bias for bets that pay o¤ when they do well. But
how do they feel about bets that pay for an (unintentional) poor performance? Do these
bets also yield a control benet or are they undesirable in this regard? The answers are not
only important for a proper understanding of the control motivation but are also crucial for
the analysis of some incentive mechanisms.
Consider the binarized scoring rule. While the rule does not explicitly present subjects
with a trade-o¤ between winning based on their performance and winning based on a random
draw, it does so implicitly. To see exactly in what way, we describe the rule for a subject who
is asked for the probability that her performance on a task is high (p
 
 = H

). In order to
focus on control issues, we ignore self-regard concerns in what follows, setting n  0.
The binarized scoring rule works as follows. After a subject reports a probability p of
being in the top half, a random number z is drawn uniformly from [0; 1]. The subject wins
an amount m if and only if (a)  = H and z  (1  p)2 or (b)  = L and z  p2.
Suppose that p  1
2
. If z  p2, she wins m regardless of her performance; if z < (1  p)2
she wins nothing regardless of her performance. In both cases, control plays no role. Control
is at play when (1  p)2  z < p2, as the subject then wins m if and only if she performs
well. Setting u (w +m) = 1 and u (w) = 0, the expected utility from a report p  1
2
is
1  p2 +
 
p2   (1  p)2

+
 
p2   (1  p)2

cH;
which is maximized at p = + cH.
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Similar reasoning shows that if p < 1
2
, control is at play when p2  z < (1  p)2, as she
then wins m if and only if  = L. Note that she now earns money for a poor performance.
Her expected utility is
1  (1  p)2 + (1  )
 
(1  p)2   p2

+ cL (1  )
 
(1  p)2   p2

,
which is maximized at p =   cL (1  ), when this is less than
1
2
.
Experiment 1 established that cH > 0, so that subjects with belief  
1
2
inate their
reports for control reasons. Whether control pushes subjects with belief  < 1
2
to inate,
deate, or neither depends on the sign of cL. That is, the impact of control depends upon a
subjects feelings about being rewarded for failure.
4.1 Three Treatments
Experiment 2 involves three treatments which share the following steps (the appendix pro-
vides the instructions that were used):
1. Subjects take a quiz in which they answer twenty multiple-choice questions. With a
50% chance subjects will be paid e0.50 for each correct answer; with a 50% chance
they will be paid according to the incentive compatible mechanism in the second part
of the experiment. (At this point, subjects are not aware of the precise nature of the
second part so that, presumably, their incentive is to do well on the quiz).
2. Subjects are then asked to report on their placement odds in one of three (monetary)
incentive compatible manners.18
Treatment 1
Each subject is asked for the probability p1 that she will place in the top half. A number
x 2 [0; 1] is drawn uniformly. If x  p1 she wins e10 if she lands in the top half, with ties
broken randomly. If x > p1 she wins e10 with probability x. In all other cases, she wins
nothing.
Treatment 2
18In contrast to Experiment 1, subjects make their predictions after having taken the test rather than
after only having seen sample questions, since they will sometimes bet on doing poorly. Because of this
and other di¤erences, the beliefs elicited in Experiments 1 and 2 are not directly comparable. This has no
consequences for our analysis.
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Subjects are given the opportunity to bet on a low placement, rather than a high one.
Each subject is asked for the probability q2 that she will place in the bottom half. A
number x 2 [0; 1] is drawn uniformly. If x  q2 she wins e10 if she lands in the bottom half,
with ties broken randomly. If x > p2 she wins e10 with probability x. In all other cases,
she wins nothing.
Treatment 3
This treatment is a mixture of the rst two.
Each subject is asked to report her belief p3 that she will place in the top half of quiz
takers. A coin is ipped and a number x 2 [0; 1] is drawn. Suppose the coin comes up heads.
Then if x  p3, she wins e10 if she lands in the top half, while if x > p3 she wins e10 with
probability x. Suppose the coin comes up tails. Then if x  1 p3, she wins e10 if she lands
in the bottom half, while if x > 1  p3 she wins e10 with probability x.
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On a conceptual level, Treatment 1 here mimics Treatment 1 in the rst experiment.
Subjects have an incentive to inate their reports, both for self-regard/signalling reasons
and in order to bet on themselves doing well.
Treatment 2 has no parallel in Experiment 1. While self-regard/signalling concerns op-
erate exactly as in Treatment 1  subjects have an incentive to underreport the probability
of placing in the bottom half, which is equivalent to overreporting the chance they end up in
the top half , control considerations are di¤erent. Here, subjects can be rewarded for doing
poorly but not for doing well. In terms of our formalism, the parameter cL, rather than cH ,
now plays a role.
4.2 Reporting Incentives
We rst analyze reporting incentives, adopting the normalizations u (w + 0) = 0 and u (w + 10) =
1, where w is a subjects initial wealth, and making the substitution q2 = 1  p2.
Consider a subject who estimates her chance of placing in the top half to be  and reports
this chance as: p1 if in Treatment 1; e¤ectively reports it as p2 = 1   q2 if in Treatment 2;
and reports it as p3 if in Treatment 3.
19In actuality, for half of the subjects in this treatment, the question was framed as a bet on placing in the
bottom half, rather than in the upper half. To both groups it was explained that, depending on the results
of the toss of the coin ip, they would end up betting either on their placement in the upper half or in the
lower half. We found no di¤erence between the two frames of choice (p-value = 0.677)
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In Treatment 1, she has an expected utility of
p1+
1  p21
2
+ cHp1+ n () p1;
which is maximized at
p1 =  (1 + cH) + n () : (9)
In Treatment 2, she has an expected utility of
(1  p2) (1  ) +
2p2   p
2
2
2
+ cL (1  p2) (1  ) + n () p2;
which is maximized at
p2 =   cL (1  ) + n () : (10)
In Treatment 3, she has an expected utility of
1
2

p3+
1  p23
2
+ cHp3

+
1
2

(1  p3) (1  ) +
2p3   p
2
3
2
+ cL (1  p3) (1  )

+n () p3;
which is maximized at
p3 = +
1
2
cH 
1
2
cL (1  ) + n () : (11)
We exploit these expressions in the next section.
4.3 Identication
We again analyze mean behaviour across treatments. From (9), (10), and (11), the theory
demands that the optimal choices satisfy p3 =
1
2
p1 +
1
2
p2. Thus, Treatment 3 does not add
anything to the estimation of the parameters but serves as a consistency check of the theory.
The theory receives conrmation  or, at least, is not rejected  as we nd that p1 = 66:2%,
p2 = 67:9% and p3 = 66:7% and, as we show later, we cannot reject p

1 = p

2 = p

3.
Given p1 = p

2, (9) and (10) together imply that
cL =  cH

1  
. (12)
Experiment 1 established a strictly positive, and statistically signicant desire for betting
on ones success. The results of this experiment show that winning money for doing poorly
provides negative utility. This nding is consistent with Heath and Tverskys (1991) nding
that subjects favour an ostensibly fair random bet over a bet that pays when they have
answered a question incorrectly. Our result goes further, indicating that the utility loss
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from a payment for doing poorly, cL (1  ), is the exact negative of the utility gain from a
payment for doing well, cH.
Returning to the binarized scoring rule, control objectives will lead a subject with belief
 to report p =  + cH =   cL (1  ), whether her belief  is above or below
1
2
(when
n  0). Thus, the binarized scoring rule is subject to control distortions similar to those
in the matching probabilities method.20 The mechanism we introduced earlier to eliminate
control distortions under the matching probabilities method can be adapted to eliminate
control distortions with this rule.
We note that the result p1 = p

2 = p

3 indicates that subjects do not change their behaviour
simply in reaction to di¤erent experimental protocols.
5 Experiments: Timelines and Statistical Analysis.
In this section, we give a detailed description of the experiments and provide a statistical
analysis of the results.
5.1 Experiment 1 - Regression analysis
The experiment was run in the CREED Lab at the University of Amsterdam in Spring
2018, using the software oTree (Chen, Schonger and Wickens, 2016) and in conjunction
with another experiment by the same authors. Three hundred and thirteen undergraduates
participated and were assigned to either Treatment 1 (N=154) or Treatment 2 (N=159).
The experiments duration was approximately 50 minutes and subjects earned e18.50 on
average.
The randomization was successful in ensuring a good gender balance, with 56.49% and
56.33% of female participants in Treatment 1 and 2, respectively. The randomization was
also balanced in terms of performance in the sample questions, a predictor of both placement
and actual performance in the subsequent test (the mean number of correct sample questions
was 2.04, out of 3, in both treatments). Two subjects opted for not reporting their gender.
They are excluded from the analysis in accordance with the pre-registration plan (including
them in the di¤erence of means test that does not need gender does not change the results).
20The quadratic scoring rule is also subject to control issues if, analogously to these ndings, subjects
value a dollar gained for doing well di¤erently than a dollar gained for doing poorly.
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A second group of subjects deserve a special statistical treatment and is selectively re-
moved in some of the analysis that follows. These are subjects with a success rate below 30%
in the visual task. These subjects are awarded enough lottery tickets to ensure a capped
probability of 1 of receiving the prize, conditional on a successful round of the visual task
being drawn for them. However, a probability of 1 is insu¢cient to achieve incentive com-
patibility (in monetary terms) for them in Treatment 2. As a result, these subjects have an
incentive to over-report in Treatment 2, giving a potential distortion to our measurements.
Hence, in most of the analysis that follows we will present results with and without this
group of subjects. When we exclude low performing subjects, we do so for both treatments
to avoid introducing a selection e¤ect.21
The main hypothesis is the existence of control motives to overstate beliefs in Treatment
1 but not in Treatment 2, while self-regard/signalling motives are the same in the two
treatments. Formally, as pre-registered, we test if the average placement p1 in Treatment 1
is statistically larger than the placement p2 in Treatment 2, by performing an independent
two-sample one-sided t-test. The test supports the hypothesis (p-value = 0.0728, N= 311;
the t test for the 282 subjects whose reports were properly incentivized, with si  3; appears
as Model A in Table 1, and Treatment 1 is signicant at the 5% level, with a p value of
0.03).
The model predicts not only that p1 > p2, but also that the distribution of reported beliefs
in treatment 1 rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of beliefs in treatment
2. We explore this hypothesis in Figure 1, where we plot the cumulative distribution of
placement by treatment. Panel 1:a includes all 311 subjects. Panel 1:b only includes subjects
for whom incentive compatibility holds.
The cumulative distribution of p1 lies below the one for p2 for the bulk of the domain.
This indicates that the result p1 > p2 is not due to only a handful of participants. Because we
had not anticipated testing for rst order stochastic dominance, we calculated our sample size
only to test whether p1 > p2. Perhaps as a result, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of di¤erence
between distributions does not reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are the same
(p value = 0:61 when the sample includes all subjects and p value = 0:295 when including
only subjects for whom incentive-compatibility holds). It is well known that the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test has low power (see, for example, Razali and Wah (2011) and Kim and Whitt
21We note that we did not anticipate the failure of incentive compatibility for some subjects and conse-
quently we did not pre-register their exclusion from the analysis.
25
Figure 1: Cumulative distributions
(a) All subjects (N=311) (b) Only incentive compatible (N=282)
2015), especially with small samples. Thus, in simulations using normal distributions with
a common standard deviation of 0:2 and a di¤erence in means of 4:33, as in our data, we
reject equality in only 39% of cases, with sample sizes of 150 from each distribution. More
data would be needed to reach conclusive results on distributional di¤erences. As we only
envisioned and pre-registered running the much more powerful di¤erence-in-means test, we
calculated the sample size to have good power for that test.
Next, we report the results of the regressions including controls in Table 1. The rst
three columns  models A-C  report results only for subjects for whom the mechanism is
incentive compatible. The table also presents, in model D, the analysis for all subjects;22 the
analysis is fundamentally unchanged. The dependent variable is Placement, the reported
probability of being in the upper half of the scores distribution. The main variable of
interest is Treatment-1, a dummy taking value 1 if the observation belongs to Treatment 1.
In accordance with the pre-registration plan, the table reports the p-values of the one-sided
test for the hypothesis p1 > p

2, though we also report the p values for the two-sided test
(in parenthesis). All our one-sided tests including controls are signicant at 5%.
The variable # of Lottery Tickets is tied to the performance in the visual task and mea-
sures how many lottery tickets are awarded to subjects who end up betting on the visual
task, conditional on having been successful in the selected round. The amount is calibrated
for every subject to ensure incentive compatibility and, as expected, the coe¢cients asso-
22In model D, we exclude the two subjects who did not report their gender, as the regression requires that
data.
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Table 1: The e¤ect of control on placement
Placement Placement Placement Placement
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Treatment 1 4.331 4.369 4.104 3.960
(0.069) (0.064) (0.077) (0.079)
Male 5.737 4.498 4.609
(0.016) (0.056) (0.042)
# of Lottery Tickets -0.288 -0.237 -0.287
(0.244) (0.331) (0.101)
Sample Score 5.164 5.344
(0.001) (0.000)
Constant 61.82 58.38 48.60 48.90
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H1: Treatment 1 > 0 (p-values) 0.0346 0.0322 0.0385 0.0469
N 282 282 282 311
R2 0.0117 0.0375 0.0760 0.0867
NOTES: The dependent variable is placement (the reported belief that own performance in the quiz is
above the median). Models A-C only include subjects for whom the elicitation is incentive compatible.
Model D reports results for the full dataset (excluding two subjects who did not report their gender).
P -values in parentheses.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
ciated to this variable are insignicant. The last control variable is Sample Score, i.e., the
number of correct answers given in the three sample questions. This variable is a signal that
subjects can use to infer how well they will perform in the quiz (which, they are told, is
based on questions similar to the sample questions).23 As expected, a better performance
on the sample quiz signicantly increases the reported placement probability. Gender also
correlates with placement reports; males tend to assign a signicantly higher probability to
the event that they will place in the top half of test takers than females. This is in line with
previous ndings that men are more condent-looking than women (see Barber and Odean
23Subjects are not told their scores on the sample questions, but it is likely that they formed some beliefs
about their performance in the sample. They are told the median score in previous sessions, and that the
sample and quiz questions are similar. This enables them to transform their absolute inference into a relative
belief.
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(2001), and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), and the references therein).
When comparing model D with the other models, we note that when the analysis ex-
clusively focuses on subjects for whom the mechanism is incentive compatible, the point
estimates of the di¤erence between the two treatments is larger and the statistical signif-
icance improves. This is not surprising since the failure of incentive compatibility gives
subjects an extra (monetary) incentive to over-report in Treatment 2, so as to reduce the
likelihood that payment depends on the visual task. It stands to reason that the removal of
these subjects strengthens the results.
5.1.1 Heterogeneous e¤ects
We now examine possible heterogeneous e¤ects of control motivations. In particular, we
explore whether control motives a¤ect reported beliefs to di¤erent degrees depending on the
condence level . As mentioned in Section 1.1, Goodie (2003), Goodie and Young (2007),
and Heath and Tversky (1991) provide some evidence that people with greater condence
in their performance exhibit a greater bias towards betting on themselves.24
We rst consider the theoretical predictions our model makes. The model is built on the
premise that a subject reaps control benets upon being paid for a successful performance.
Hence, there is an intuitive sense that distortions brought about by a manipulation of control
motives, such as in our experiment, should be increasing in a subjects perceived likelihood
of success.
Recall that optimal reported beliefs are p1 =  (1 + CH) +N () and p

2 = +
N()
CH+1
. Thus,
dp1
d
= (1 + CH) +N
0 ()
dp2
d
= 1 +
N 0 ()
CH + 1
With the minimal assumptions we have made on N so far, namely N ()  0, it is possible
that
dp
i
d
< 0. That is, people with lower beliefs could make higher reports. Clearly, making
an inated report for self-regard/signalling reasons does not make much sense if high reports
indicate low beliefs. Indeed, a fully articulated signalling model would start with assumptions
to ensure that higher types make higher reports. Accordingly, let us now assume that
(1 + CH) >  N
0 (). The model then predicts that
dp
1
d
;
dp
2
d
> 0.
This prediction is of limited interest, obtaining even if people have no control or signalling
objectives (CH = 0  N). A more interesting prediction comes from examining p

1 p

2. The
24This is true of Heath and Tverskys rst three experiments but not their fourth.
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di¤erence p1   p

2 comes from the control motivation in Treatment 1. We have that
d (p1   p

2)
d
= CH(1 +
N 0 ()
CH + 1
) > 0
Thus, the model predicts that the distortion due to control is increasing in beliefs.
We now turn to our data. Using subjects placement as an estimator for condence levels
would lead to obvious endogeneity problems when testing whether p1  p2 is increasing in .
We instead use the score obtained on the sample questions as a proxy for condence. This
score is a strong predictor of both performance in the actual quiz and reported placement
probability (p-values  0:000 in OLS regressions, as reported in the Appendix), suggesting
that performance in the sample questions is both a valuable signal for future performance in
the quiz and an information seemingly used by subjects to determine their condence level.
Equipped with this proxy for condence, we set to explore its impact on the distance
between reported probabilities in the two treatments. Figure 2 plots Placement against
Sample Score and, in addition, presents two separate regression lines for the two treatments.
Panel 2:a includes only subjects for whom the elicitation is incentive compatible. Panel 2:b
further excludes 3 outliers who answered zero sample questions correctly.
Figure 2: Heterogeneous e¤ects
(a) Only incentive compatible (N=282) (b) Exclusion of outliers (N=279)
The scatter plots inclusive of all subjects are not reported but are similar to the ones
in the gure. The plots suggest that the degree of the distortion is slightly increasing in
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condence. Interestingly, the point estimate of the e¤ect of control (as captured by our
treatment e¤ect) for subjects who answered one sample question correctly is zero. However,
the slope coe¢cients are not statistically di¤erent from one another (p-value = 0.2673).
We further explore the relationship between condence  and treatment di¤erences
with a second set of specications in which we additionally include the interaction variable
Treatment-1  Sample Score.
Table 2: Heterogeneous e¤ect - The role of condence
Placement Placement Placement Placement
Model E Model F Model G Model H
Treatment 1 -10.61 -2.811 0
(0.048) (0.677) ()
Sample Score 4.332 3.813 4.332
(0.007) (0.061) (0.007)
Treat.1 X Sample Score 7.005 2.064 3.245 2.064
(0.002) (0.046) (0.283) (0.046)
Male 5.031 4.526 4.524 4.526
(0.032) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Constant 54.57 46.17 47.40 46.17
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 282 282 282 282
R2 0.0648 0.0761 0.0767 0.0761
NOTES: The dependent variable is placement (the reported belief that own performance
in the quiz is above the median). Models E-G are OLS regressions. Model H is a semi-
structural estimation imposing the models restriction that Treatment 1 > 0. P -values in
parentheses.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
If treatment di¤erences are indeed increasing in condence, we should observe a larger
treatment e¤ect as the sample score (and therefore ) increases. Hence our estimation for the
coe¢cient of the interaction term should be positive and signicant. The results are presented
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in Table 2. Models E-G are OLS regressions, showing that the interaction term is positive and
only insignicant when both Treatment   1 and Sample Score are included as regressors.
Model H is a semi-structural estimation imposing a model restriction that derives from
assuming the presence of control motives. More specically, as highlighted by Proposition 1,
CH > 0 implies p

1 > p

2 for all . In accordance with this restriction, we run a constrained
regression imposing that the intercept estimated for treatment 1 must lie weakly above the
intercept for treatment 2. The estimation is reported under Model H, which is essentially
equivalent to model F given the negative sign of the estimated Treatment-1 coe¢cient in
Model G, which is the unrestricted version of model H. The e¤ect of the interaction term
becomes signicant at the 5% level. The regression analysis with the exclusion of the 3
outliers (who scored zero in the sample questions) is fundamentally unchanged. All things
considered, we nd suggestive but not particularly robust evidence that control motives are
increasing in condence levels. One must still keep in mind that this is an out of sample
prediction of our model (it was not built to yield this prediction), that the data is in line
with the prediction (and, importantly, does not reject it), and that the sample size of the
experiment was intended for the more basic test of p1 > p2:
Note that our prediction that more condent individuals inate more for control reasons is
unrelated to the Kruger and Dunning (1999) unskilled and unaware e¤ect, which maintains
that unskilled people are especially overcondent in their beliefs, as this e¤ect is about
peoples actual beliefs, not their reports of these beliefs. Moreover, control is not implicated
in the Kruger and Dunning experiments, which elicit beliefs in an unincentivized manner.
5.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was run in the same laboratory in Fall 2016. One hundred ninety-six under-
graduates participated, drawn again from the University of Amsterdam. No subject took
part in both experiments.
The three treatments exhibit basically the same average estimate of pi. In Treatment 1,
with 68 subjects, p1 = 66:2%; in Treatment 2, with 61 subjects, p2 = 67:9%; in Treatment 3,
with 67 subjects, p3 = 66:7%. There are large standard deviations of comparable magnitude
across treatments (16:9, 18:5 and 19:8 for Treatments 1  3 respectively).
We perform two tests. With the Wilcoxon rank sum (Whitney-Newey) test, the p value
for equality of distributions is 0:61 for Treatments 1 and 2, 0:76 for treatments 2 and 3, and
0:78 for Treatments 1 and 3. We also run the corresponding t test for di¤erence of means
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and we do not reject equality (p value = 0:58 for Treatments 1 and 2, 0:72 for Treatments 2
and 3, and 0:88 for Treatments 1 and 3).
These ndings establish that in the experiment the positive control kick for a favourable
bet on self is the same as the negative kick for a bet that the subject will place in the bottom
half. They also constitute evidence in favour of the theory, which requires p3 =
1
2
p1 +
1
2
p2;
and is not rejected by the data.
6 Conclusion
Social scientists are interested in peoples beliefs about themselves. One way to elicit these
beliefs is simply to ask for them. However, with little at stake, people may provide ready
answers that have little connection to their actual beliefs. To counter this possibility, re-
searchers have designed payment schemes that reward people for accurately reporting their
beliefs. In particular, a variety of payment schemes have been designed so that people
maximize their utility of money by reporting their actual beliefs.
However, these schemes remain vulnerable to distortions, as subjects may care about more
than money. Our study joins work by Heath and Tversky (1991), Goodie and Young (2007),
Burks et al. (2013), Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014), and Ewers and Zimmermann
(2015), among others, in determining that non-monetary considerations may lead subjects to
overstate their beliefs about themselves under ostensibly incentive compatible mechanisms.
In one experiment, using the matching probabilities method, subjects inate their reported
beliefs about themselves by 7% for control reasons; non-monetary considerations account for
at least 27% of what would otherwise be estimated to be overcondence.
Our study di¤ers from earlier ones in that we introduce a new design that eliminates the
control bias for self-bets. This design can be used in a variety of contexts where control is a
factor.
7 Appendix A. Using Sample Score as a proxy for con-
dence
In this section, we discuss the merits of utilizing the variable Sample Score (i.e. the number
of correct answers in the sample questions) as a proxy for the unobservable true beliefs,
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. While we do not observe true beliefs, the intuition suggests (and our model predicts)
that they correlate with reported beliefs, as captured by the variable Placement. Table
3 shows that Sample Score is indeed a strong predictor of both reported beliefs (used as
dependent variable in models J and K) and actual performance (measured by a dummy
variable indicating whether a subject placed in the upper half of the score distribution 
models L and M). We conclude that Sample Score is a strong signal for future performance
and that, conceivably, subjects use it to predict how well they will do in the quiz. Each
additional correct answer in the sample questions is associated to an increase of 5 percentage
points in subjective placement and of 24 percentage points in the actual chances of belonging
to the top half of quiz takers. Interestingly, subjects seem to underestimate the predictive
power of the signal they are provided. Yet, the strong correlations observed, allow us to
condently use Sample Score as a proxy for true beliefs in the analysis on heterogenous
e¤ects.
Table 3: Sample Score as a predictor of performance and beliefs
Placement Placement Performance Performance
Model J Model K Model L Model M
Sample Score 5.804 5.257 0.240 0.238
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 4.535 0.0249
(0.054) (0.661)
Treatment 1 4.006 -0.00248
(0.084) (0.965)
Constant 51.66 44.39 0.0137 -0.0160
(0.000) (0.000) (0.865) (0.884)
N 282 282 282 282
R2 0.0501 0.0728 0.137 0.137
NOTES: The dependent variable is Placement in models J and K, and Performance (a
dummy variable taking value 1 if the subject placed in the top half of quiz takers) in
models L and M. P -values in parentheses.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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8 Appendix B. Instructions for Experiment 1
We present a short version of the instructions for Experiment 1. In particular, we have
edited out the portion of the instructions pertaining to another experiment about the Kruger
and Dunning (1999) unskilled and unaware e¤ect, which was run in conjunction with
Experiment 1. We refer to the papers online Appendix for the full version of the instructions.
Explanatory comments from the authors are, at times, interspersed among the instructions.
They are indicated by use of the italic font and enclosed in square brackets.
Instructions
Welcome! This is an experiment in decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make
good decisions you will earn a substantial amount of money. The money you earn will be
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment has three parts, and
there is a show-up fee of 5 euro that you will earn regardless of your choices. The entire
experiment will take place on computer terminals. Please do not talk or communicate with
each other in any way and turn o¤ your phones now.
Preamble: Measuring your beliefs about the likelihood of events
[The preamble explains the betting mechanism for eliciting beliefs in general terms. Part 3
adapts the mechanism to the specic setup of Experiment 1].
In this experiment, you will be taking various trivia and logic quizzes. About half of your
earnings will depend on how well you did in these quizzes, while the other half will depend
on how accurately you evaluate your own performance. In particular, you will be asked the
likelihood of certain events, with questions such as What are the chances that you gave
the correct answer in the question you just answered? or What are the chances that you
performed better than the median subject?.
Here we explain the procedure that will be used throughout the experiment to reward
you for the accuracy of your self-assessment.
As an illustration, suppose that you are asked the following question: Who is the current
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? to which you answer Theresa May. You are then
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asked: What are the chances that the answer you just gave was correct?.
Your answer to this question will be measured in chances, which go from 0 (standing
for: I am absolutely sure that I gave the wrong answer) to 100 (standing for: I am absolutely
sure that I gave the right answer). So for example:
 50 means that there are exactly equal chances that you were right or wrong;
 33.3 (that is, one-third of 100) means that you think you have a 1-over-3 chance to be
correct, or, in other words, that you have the same chances to be correct as are the
chances to cast a 6-face die and draw a number smaller or equal to 2.
 75 means that you have the same chances to be correct as are the chances that a white
ball is drawn from a bag with 75 white balls and 25 blue balls; and so on.
Review questions:
 What are the chances that you toss a fair coin and you get Tails?
 In a multiple-choice question with 4 options, if you blindly pick one at random, what
are the chances that it will be correct?
Incentives: How you are rewarded for reporting your chances accurately
We follow a special procedure to reward you for your self-assessment. This procedure is a bit
complicated but the important thing to remember is that it is designed so that it is in your
best interest to report your most accurate guess about your real chances. The procedure is
as follows.
On the screen, you can visualize a virtual bag. The bag is currently empty and will be lled
with 100 blue and white balls. The exact composition of the virtual bag will be determined
at the end of the experiment by a random device that will pick one of the following pos-
sibilities with equal likelihood: (0 white, 100 blue), (1 white, 99 blue), (2 white, 98 blue)
... (99 white, 1 blue), (100 white, 0 blue). There is a prize that you have the chance to
win by either betting on your answer being correct or by betting on a white draw from the
virtual bag. Whether you prefer to bet on your answer being correct or on the white draw
from the virtual bag depends on how many white balls are in the bag. When there are 0
white balls, you probably prefer to bet on your answer being correct as in most situations
you have at least some chances to be correct, no matter how small, while you will never
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draw a white ball from a bag that contains exclusively blue balls. On the other extreme,
when there are 100 white balls, you will probably prefer to bet on the virtual bag rather
than on your answer, because it is guaranteed that you will win the prize from a bag with
such a composition, whereas a grain of doubt may remain about the correctness of your
answer. Somewhere in between 0 and 100 there is a number of white balls that makes you
indi¤erent between betting on the correctness of your answer and betting on the virtual bag.
We interpret this number as the chances that your answer is correct. In other words, if you
are indi¤erent between betting on the bag with x white balls and betting on the correct-
ness of your answer, it means you think you have exactly x/100 of having answered correctly.
So, to incentivize you to be truthful, after you report your chances p to be correct in a
question, your payment will be determined as follows:
 If, at the end of the experiment, in the virtual bag there are more than p white balls,
you will bet on the virtual bag. That is, we will draw a random ball from the bag,
and, if the ball is white you win 4 euro, if not you earn 0 euro.
 If instead in the virtual bag there are p white balls or less, you will bet on the correctness
of your answer. That is, if your answer is correct you win 4 euro and if it is incorrect
you win 0 euro.
Take some time to verify that it is indeed in your best interest to state your chances
truthfully. Suppose that you believe you have 70/100 chances that your answer was correct.
Then it means that you prefer to bet on your answer being correct, rather than to bet on
a white draw from the bag, if in the bag there are fewer than 70 white balls. Viceversa, if
in the bag there are more than 70 white balls, you prefer to draw from the bag and hope in
a white draw, which has more than 70/100 chance to happen. Being truthful ensures that
you always get the better deal between the two options, given your beliefs. We will use this
procedure several times throughout the experiment so make sure you understand it, and
please feel free to ask any questions.
Part 1
[Edited out because not relevant for Experiment 1].
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Part 2: Visual Task
In this part of the experiment, you will perform 12 repetitions of the following exercise. You
will see a string of numbers blinking on the screen and will then have to type the numbers
into the box appearing on the screen.
The duration of the blinks and the number of elements in the string will vary across periods,
hence remembering the string will be easier in some periods and more di¢cult in others.
You will face two practice rounds and then repeat this exercise 10 times for payment.
Payment:
At the end of the experiment, one round will be selected at random. If in that round you
reported the string of numbers correctly, you earn 2 euro, otherwise you earn 0 euro.
Click on the Next button to proceed to the two sample rounds.
Part 3: Logic quiz
In this section, you are asked to answer a logic Quiz. The Quiz consists of 12 multiple-choice
questions and you have 6 minutes to answer all the questions.
Self-assessment
Before you take the Quiz, we ask you to estimate how well you will do relative to the other
subjects. Specically, we ask you how likely you think it is that you will do better than half
of the participants. Here is how. After the quiz is complete, you will be assigned a ranking
according to how many questions you answer correctly. The best performer among you will
be assigned to rank 1, the second to rank 2 and so on.
We will then list the participants from the highest rank to the lowest rank and divide the
subject pool into two equally sized-groups, an upper half and a lower half. For example,
with 30 subjects the top 15 will be ranked in the upper half and the other 15 will be ranked
in the lower half. If two people are tied for 15th in terms of performance, then one of them
will be randomly placed in the top half and one of them in the lower half.
We want you to tell us your best estimate of the probability that you are in the upper half.
Your answer to this question will be measured in chances, which go from 0 (standing for:
I am absolutely sure that my score will not be in the upper half of the distribution) to 100
(standing for: I am absolutely sure that my score will be in the upper half of the distribu-
tion). So for example, 50 means that there are exactly equal chances that you score in the
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upper or the lower half, and so on.
[The following portion of the instructions is di¤erent in the two treatments. Instructions for
the two treatments are reported one after the other]
Treatment 1: Payment based on lottery tickets and BDM
Your payment for reporting your chances follows a procedure similar to the one outlined in
the preamble, that is, you will either bet on your placement in the upper half or on a white
draw from the virtual bag. The only di¤erence is that the prize now is 10 lottery tickets
(each one worth a 3% chance of winning 20 euro). The procedure will go as follows. You
will report your chance p of being in the upper half and then the computer will randomly
determine the number of white balls in the virtual bag. Your payment will be determined
as follows:
 If the number of white balls is equal to or smaller than p, then you will be betting
on your placement in the upper half. That is, you will receive the 10 lottery tickets
(worth in total a 30% chance of winning 20 euro) if your score indeed placed in the
upper half of the distribution of scores, and otherwise you will get nothing.
 If instead the number of white balls in the virtual bag is larger than p, then you will
bet on the virtual bag. That is, a ball will be drawn from the virtual bag and if it
is white you will receive the 10 lottery tickets (again worth in total a 30% chance of
winning 20 euro), otherwise you will get nothing.
Treatment 2: Payment based on lottery tickets and VisualTask-BDM
Your payment for reporting your chances follows a procedure similar to the one outlined in
the preamble with two di¤erences: (1) the prize for winning is now given by a number of
lottery tickets (each one worth a 3% chance of winning 20 euro); and (2) your choice will
not be between betting on your placement or betting on the virtual bag, but rather between
betting on your placement in the Quiz or betting on your performance in the Visual Task.
The procedure is as follows: You will report your chances p of being in the upper half
and then the computer will randomly determine the number of white balls in the virtual
bag. Then:
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 If the number of white balls is equal to or smaller than p, then you will be betting
on your placement in the upper half. That is, you will receive the 10 lottery tickets
(worth in total a 30% chance of winning 20 euro) if your score indeed placed in the
upper half of the distribution, and otherwise you will get nothing.
 If instead the number of white balls in the virtual bag is larger than p, then you will
bet on the visual task. That is, a ball will be drawn from the virtual bag and one of
the 10 rounds that you completed in the visual task will be extracted at random (with
each round having the exact same probability of being selected). If the ball is white
and you were successful at the visual task in the extracted round, you will receive N
lottery tickets (worth in total a M percent chance of winning 20 euro) otherwise you
receive zero euro. The number of lottery tickets that you can win is calibrated on your
performance in the visual task to ensure that it is indeed in your best interest to report
the chances of being in the upper half accurately. [Note: in the experimental screen,
N and M were replaced by personalized values, calibrated for each subject depending
on their success rate in the visual task].
[The remaining instructions are common to both treatments]
Before you state your chances of being in the upper half, you will answer 3 sample questions
which are comparable in di¢culty to the questions that you will nd in the Quiz. There
is no payment for the sample questions. You are now ready to start the sample questions.
Please click on the Next button now.
[The following is the message visualized on the screen after the subjects complete the sample
questions]
What are your chances to be in the upper half of the scores distribution? Type a number
between 0 (meaning: I have zero chance to be in the upper half) to 100 (meaning: I am
absolutely sure I will be in the upper half of score distribution).
Note:
 The sample questions you just saw are of comparable di¢culty to the actual questions
you will encounter in the Quiz.
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 In past experiments, the better performing half of the subjects answered 7 or more
questions correctly, out of a total of 12 questions.
9 Appendix C. Instructions for Experiment 2
We present instructions for Experiment 2. Explanatory comments from the authors are, at
times, interspersed among the instructions. They are indicated by use of the italic font and
enclosed in square brackets.
Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Funds have been provided to run this experiment.
If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you will earn a substantial amount
of money. The money you earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The session will take place through computer terminals. There is a show-up fee of 10 euro
that you will earn regardless of your choices. The experiment will consist of two parts. At
the end of the experiment, a random device will determine whether you are going to be paid
according to your answers in the rst part or in the second part of the experiment, with a
50% chance that each part is used for payment.
Please turn o¤ your phones now and do not talk or communicate to each other in any
way.
First part
In the rst part of the experiment, you are asked to answer a logic quiz. The quiz consists
of 20 multiple-choice questions and you have 13 minutes to answer the questions. You will
earn 50 cents for each correct answer and zero cents for each incorrect answer. Hence, if this
rst part of the experiment is randomly drawn and used for payment, you can earn from a
minimum of 10 euro to a maximum of 20 euro including the show-up fee.
[The second part is presented separately for each of the 3 treatments].
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Second part (Treatment 1 - Betting up)
In this second part of the experiment, we ask you to estimate how well you did in the quiz
relative to the other subjects. Of course, you cannot know your relative performance for
sure so we will ask you for a probability estimate. Specically, we will ask you with which
probability you think you placed in the upper half of subjects.
You will be assigned a ranking based on how many questions you answered correctly in
the quiz you just took. The best performer among you will be assigned to rank 1, the second
best performer to rank 2 and so on. We will then list the participants in the experiment from
the highest rank to the lowest rank and divide the subject pool into two equally sized-groups,
an upper half and a lower half. For example, with 14 subjects the top 7 will be ranked in
the upper half and the other seven will be ranked in the lower half. If, say, two people are
tied for 7th in terms of performance, then one of them will be randomly placed in the upper
half and one of them in the lower half.
We want you to tell us your best estimate of the probability that you are in the upper
half. For this purpose, we will use a special payment procedure that rewards you for giving
us your best estimate. The procedure is a bit complicated but the most important thing to
understand about it is simply that you maximize your expected payment by reporting your
best estimate. We now explain this procedure.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will create a virtual bag. The bag will be lled
with 100 blue and white balls. The exact composition of the virtual bag will be determined at
the end of the experiment by a random device that will pick one of the following possibilities
with equal likelihood: (0 white, 100 blue), (2 white, 98 blue), (4 white, 96 blue) ... (98 white,
2 blue), (100 white, 0 blue) - so the virtual bag will have one among all possible combinations
of white and blue balls with increments of two.
There is a prize of 10 euro that you have a chance to win by either betting on your
placement or by betting on the virtual bag. For each of the possible combinations, we want
to know if you prefer to bet on your placement or to bet on a white draw from the virtual
bag. Choices will be presented to you in a list of pairwise comparisons, as shown in Figure
1.
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Figure 1. Choices
In each comparison you choose between betting on your placement-up or on the
virtual bag:
 If you bet on your placement-up, you win 10 euro if you are in the upper half of the
ranking and 0 euro otherwise.
 If you bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is drawn from the virtual
bag and 0 euro otherwise.
Thresholds: The number of white balls represents your chances of winning when you
bet on the virtual bag. The number of white balls increases as you scroll down the list, so
the virtual bag becomes more attractive the more down you go on the list. Hence we expect
that, if you choose the virtual bag in one comparison, you will choose the virtual bag in all
comparisons that follow below it. In other words, we expect that you will have a threshold,
that is, a certain amount of white balls such that you bet on your placement-up until that
threshold and then switch to bet on the virtual bag if it contains more white balls than the
threshold. We will interpret this threshold as the probability that you believe your score
falls in the upper half of the distribution.
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You can try out di¤erent thresholds and your choice will be nal only when you click on
the Next button. Remember, once again, that you maximize your chances of winning if your
threshold is the probability that you assign to having a quiz score in the upper half of the
distribution.
At the end of the experiment, a random device will select one of the questions, that is, one
of the possible bag compositions. Then one ball will be extracted from the virtual bag. Your
payment will depend on the color of the ball and your choice in the selected question. To
recap, if, in the selected question:
 You bet on the virtual bag, then you win 10 euro if a white ball is randomly extracted
from the bag;
 You chose to bet on you placement-up, then you win 10 euro if you placed in the upper
half.
Examples: Lisa thinks there is a 60% chance she placed in the upper half. Hence, she
chooses to bet on her placement-up if in the bag there are 60 white balls or fewer and on
the virtual bag if it contains more than 60 white balls. She, therefore, clicks all the buttons
according to this rule and her choices will look as in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Lisas Choices
John thinks there is a 20% chance he placed in the upper half. Hence, he chooses to
bet on his placement-up if there are 20 white balls or fewer in the virtual bag, otherwise he
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prefers to bet on the virtual bag. He clicks the buttons according to this threshold and his
choices will look as in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Johns Choices
Second part (Treatment 2 - Betting down)
In this second part of the experiment, we ask you to estimate how well you did in the quiz
relative to the other subjects. Of course, you cannot know your relative performance for
sure so we will ask you for a probability estimate. Specically, we will ask you with which
probability you think you placed in the lower half of subjects.
You will be assigned a ranking based on how many questions you answered correctly in
the quiz you just took. The best performer among you will be assigned to rank 1, the second-
best performer to rank 2 and so on. We will then list the participants in the experiment from
the highest rank to the lowest rank and divide the subject pool into two equally sized-groups,
an upper half and a lower half. For example, with 14 subjects, the top 7 will be ranked in
the upper half and the other seven will be ranked in the lower half. If, say, two people are
tied for 7th in terms of performance, then one of them will be randomly placed in the upper
half and one of them in the lower half.
We want you to tell us your best estimate of the probability that you are in the lower
half. For this purpose, we will use a special payment procedure that rewards you for giving
us your best estimate. The procedure is a bit complicated but the most important thing to
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understand about it is simply that you maximize your expected payment by reporting your
best estimate. We now explain this procedure.
At the end of the experiment the computer will create a virtual bag. The bag will be lled
with 100 blue and white balls. The exact composition of the virtual bag will be determined at
the end of the experiment by a random device that will pick one of the following possibilities
with equal likelihood: (0 white, 100 blue), (2 white, 98 blue), (4 white, 96 blue) ... (98 white,
2 blue), (100 white, 0 blue) - so the virtual bag will have one among all possible combinations
of white and blue balls with increments of two.
There is a prize of 10 euro that you have a chance to win by either betting on your
placement or by betting on the virtual bag. For each of the possible combinations, we want
to know if you prefer to bet on your placement or to bet on a white draw from the virtual
bag. Choices will be presented to you in a list of pairwise comparisons, as shown in Figure
1.
Figure 1. Choices
In each comparison you choose between betting on your placement-down or on
the virtual bag:
 If you bet on your placement-down, you win 10 euro if you are in the lower half of
the ranking and 0 euro otherwise.
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 If you bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is drawn from the virtual
bag and 0 euro otherwise.
Thresholds: The number of white balls represents your chances of winning when you
bet on the virtual bag. The number of white balls increases as you scroll down the list, so
the virtual bag becomes more attractive the more down you go on the list. Hence we expect
that, if you choose the virtual bag in one comparison, you will choose the virtual bag in all
comparisons that follow below it. In other words, we expect that you will have a threshold,
that is, a certain amount of white balls such that you bet on your placement-down until that
threshold and then switch to bet on the virtual bag if it contains more white balls than the
threshold. We will interpret this threshold as the probability that you believe your score
falls in the lower half of the distribution.
You can try out di¤erent thresholds and your choice will be nal only when you click on
the Next button. Remember, once again, that you maximize your chances of winning if your
threshold is the probability that you assign to having a quiz score in the lower half of the
distribution.
At the end of the experiment, a random device will select one of the questions, i.e. one of
the possible bag compositions. Then one ball will be extracted from the virtual bag. Your
payment will depend on the color of the ball and your choice in the selected question. To
recap, if, in the selected question:
 You bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is randomly extracted from
the bag;
 You chose to bet on you placement-down, you win 10 euro if you placed in the lower
half.
Examples: Lisa thinks there is a 60% chance she placed in the lower half. Hence, she
chooses to bet on her placement-down if in the bag there are 60 white balls or fewer and on
the virtual bag if it contains more than 60 white balls. She, therefore, clicks all the buttons
according to this rule and her choices will look as in Figure 2:
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Figure 2. Lisas Choices
John thinks there is a 20% chance he placed in the lower half. Hence, he chooses to bet
on his placement-down if there are fewer than 20 white balls in the virtual bag, otherwise
he prefers to bet on the virtual bag. He clicks the buttons according to this threshold and
his choices will look as in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Johns Choices
Second part (Treatment 3 - Betting up and down)
In this second part of the experiment, we ask you to estimate how well you did on the quiz
relative to the other subjects. Of course, you cannot know your relative performance for
47
sure so we will ask you for a probability estimate. Specically, we will ask you with which
probability you think you placed in the lower half of subjects.25
You will be assigned a ranking based on how many questions you answered correctly on
the quiz you just took. The best performer among you will be assigned to rank 1, the second
best performer to rank 2 and so on. If there are ties, these ties will be broken randomly, so
that everyone is assigned a unique rank.
We will then list the participants in the experiment from the highest rank to the lowest
rank and divide the subject pool into two equally sized-groups, an upper half and a lower
half. For example, with 14 subjects the top 7 will be ranked in the upper half and the
other seven will be ranked in the lower half. If, say, two people are tied for 7th in terms of
performance, then one of them will be randomly placed in the upper half and one of them
in the lower half.
We want you to tell us your best estimate of the probability that you are in the lower
half. For this purpose, we will use a special payment procedure that rewards you for giving
us your best estimate. The procedure is a bit complicated but the most important thing to
understand about it is simply that you maximize your expected payment by reporting your
best estimate. We now explain this procedure.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will create a virtual bag. The bag will be lled
with 100 blue and white balls. The exact composition of the virtual bag will be determined at
the end of the experiment by a random device that will pick one of the following possibilities
with equal likelihood: (0 white, 100 blue), (2 white, 98 blue), (4 white, 96 blue) ... (98 white,
2 blue), (100 white, 0 blue) - so the virtual bag will have one among all possible combinations
of white and blue balls with increments of two.
There is a prize of 10 euro that you have a chance to win by either betting on your
placement or by betting on the virtual bag. For each of the possible combinations, we want
to know if you prefer to bet on your placement or to bet on a white draw from the virtual
bag. Choices will be presented to you in two groups of pairwise comparisons, as shown in
Figure 1.
25 [Note: In this treatment, subjects bet on both their performance being in the upper part and in the lower
part of the distribution. In 2 (out of 4) sessions, the framing of the instructions starts o¤ with betting-down
and later introduces betting-up, in the other two treatments the order in which the two types of bets are
presented is reversed].
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Figure 1. Choices
In the column on the left, you choose between betting on your placement-down
or on the virtual bag:
 If you bet on your placement-down, you win 10 euro if you are in the lower half of
the ranking and 0 euro otherwise.
 If you bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is drawn from the virtual
bag and 0 euro otherwise.
In the column on the right, you choose between betting on your placement-up
or on the virtual bag:
 If you bet on your placement-up, you win 10 euro if you are in the upper half of the
ranking and 0 euro otherwise.
 If you bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is drawn from the virtual
bag and 0 euro otherwise.
[Note: In 2 (out of 4) sessions of treatment 3, the order of the columns was reversed and the
instructions were adjusted accordingly. As a result, subjects would bet on their placement-up
in the column on the left, and on their placement-down in the column on the right.]
Thresholds: The number of white balls represents your chances of winning when you bet
on the virtual bag. In the left column, the number of white balls increases as you scroll
down the list, so the virtual bag becomes more attractive the more down you go on the
list. Hence we expect that, if you choose the virtual bag in one comparison, you will choose
the virtual bag in all comparisons that follow below it. In other words, we expect that you
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will have a threshold, that is, a certain amount of white balls such that you bet on your
placement-down until that threshold and then switch to bet on the virtual bag if it contains
more white balls than the threshold. We will interpret this threshold as the probability that
you believe your score falls in the lower half of the distribution.
Your choices from the right column. In the right column, you are choosing be-
tween betting on your placement-up or the virtual bag. Here the order of the virtual bags
is reversed: The number of white balls starts at 100 and decreases as you scroll down the
list. Here again, you will have a threshold: You will start betting on the virtual bag and
then switch at some point to betting on your placement-up. This threshold will tell us the
probability with which you believe your score belongs to the upper half of the distribution.
Admissible choices: The choices from the two columns are tied together, that is, the
two thresholds will have to be placed on the same line. The reason is that if you
told us that there is an x% chance that your rank is in the lower half, we will presume you
think there is a 100  x% chance that your score is in the upper half. In Figure 5, you can
see a preview of what it means for the two thresholds to be placed on the same line. Well
go back to it at the end.
A way to ensure you are meeting this constraint is to verify that, taking two questions
placed on the same line, you are betting on the virtual bag in one and only one of them.
Figure 2 shows two examples of non-admissible choices. Figure 3 shows two examples of
admissible choices. If you make a mistake, an error message will prompt you to correct your
entries until only admissible choices are present.
Figure 2. Non-admissible choices
Figure 3. Admissible choices
You can try out di¤erent thresholds and your choice will be nal only when you click
on the Next button. Remember, once again, that you maximize your chances of winning if,
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in the left column, your threshold is the probability that you assign to having a quiz score
in the lower half of the distribution, and, in the right column, you pick as threshold the
probability that your score is in the upper half.
At the end of the experiment, a random device will select one of the two groups of questions
and one of the possible bag compositions. Then one ball will be extracted from the virtual
bag. Your payment will depend on the color of the ball and your choice in the selected
question. To recap, if in the selected question:
 You bet on the virtual bag, you win 10 euro if a white ball is randomly extracted from
the bag;
 You chose to bet on your placement-down, you win 10 euro if you placed in the lower
half;
 You chose to bet on your placement-up, you win 10 euro if you placed in the upper
half.
Examples: Lisa thinks there is a 60% chance she placed in the lower half and a 40%
chance she placed in the upper half. Hence, she chooses to bet on her placement-down if in
the bag there are 60 white balls or fewer. Moreover, she chooses to bet on her placement-up if
there are fewer than 40 white balls in the bag. She therefore clicks all the buttons according
to this rule and her choices will look as in Figure 4:
Figure 4. Lisas Choices
John thinks there is a 20% chance he placed in the lower half. Hence, he chooses to bet
on his placement-down rather than on the virtual bag if there are fewer than 20 white balls
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in the virtual bag, otherwise he prefers to bet on the bag. He clicks the buttons according
to this threshold and his choices will look as in Figure 5. This should be consistent with his
belief that there is an 80% probability that he scored in the upper half.
Figure 5. Johns Choices
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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
The study has two goals: a) Establish to what extent "control" (the desire to bet on activities where one could in principle affect the outcome) affects the
self-reported estimated probabilities of success, when these are elicited with the probability matching rule of Karni (2009) and Grether (1981) (we replicate
the mechanism of Benoît, Dubra and Moore (2015) but the prize will be lottery tickets). b) Establish whether individuals who are incompetent in a task are
comparatively more unaware of their (in)competence than their more skilled counterparts (see Kruger and Dunning). We intend to test the KD effect
against an alternative model of regression to the mean paired with general overconfidence, which can generate the same empirical patterns ascribed, thus
far, to the KD effect.
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
) a) The dependent variable is the self-reported belief of the likelihood that the subject performs better than half of the other subjects in a quiz. We will
compare two measures: A control measure of overconfidence elicited with the probability matching rule (with payment in lottery tickets); and a treatment
measure of overconfidence elicited with a modified version of the probability matching rule where the outcome is always dependent on the performance
of the subject (either in the main task or in a secondary visual/memory task performed in the computer). b) The key variables utilized in the structural
estimation are the self-reported prior and posterior probabilities of answering the trivia questions correctly and of performing better than the median
subject. These measures will be elicited with the probability matching rule.
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
a) We will have two treatments (with around 150 participants in each) corresponding to the two different ways of measuring beliefs as explained in section
3. 
b) For the estimation of beliefs, there will be one treatment of about 300 subjects.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
a) We will perform a test of difference of means: we will have elicited beliefs with two methods, and we will compare whether the means are significantly
different. 
b) We will perform two analyses: 
1) We will postulate a single signaling structure for all participants (as in Benoit and Dubra 2011), and estimate the parameters with by Maximum
Likelihood. Then we will estimate (by MLE) one signaling structure for the skilled and one for the unskilled and perform a Neyman-Pearson test comparing
the two models. 
2) In the first part of the study we will elicit a prior and a posterior probability of answering each question correctly. With this information, we will estimate
the parameters of the signaling structure. We will estimate one signaling structure for each group (skilled and unskilled) and test whether the estimated
parameters are statistically different. We will also test whether, for all subjects, the predicted posterior probabilities after a correct answer are more
accurate than after an incorrect answer.
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
Only those who choose not to complete the experiment will be excluded.
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
Around 300 subjects will participate, depending on how experimental sessions are filled.
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
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